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WHEN IS FINALITY .. . FINAL?
REHEARING AND RESURRECTION
IN THE SUPREME COURT
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl*
I. INTRODUCTION
It ain't over till it's over.
And yet the question remains: When, exactly, is it over?
Perhaps the safest answer, when it comes to litigation, is that it
is never over, at least if we mean absolutely and irretrievably
over.1 Nonetheless, while recognizing that absolute repose might
not be found in this world, we often say that a case is over once
the judgment becomes "final." Now, finality is a word of many
meanings, so one has to be careful in using it.2 The particular
type of finality that concerns us here is the finality that attaches
* Associate Professor, University of Houston Law Center. I thank Gabriel (Jack) Chin,
Margaret Cordray, Stephen McAllister, Brent Newton, and Stephen Shapiro for comments
on an earlier version of this essay. I thank Melissa Grobler for helpful research assistance.
1. See e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (providing for reopening judgments in certain
circumstances).
2. See Clay v. U.S., 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003) (observing that "[f]inality is variously
defined" and listing several different meanings). For instance, one important meaning of
finality that is not at issue in this Article concerns the time at which a trial court judgment
becomes ripe for appeal under the "final judgment" rule.
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when the direct appellate process has run its course. This type of
finality is important because it marks the point at which a case
outcome is no longer routinely subject to revision based on
changes in the governing law. A case that is still on appeal is not
yet final in this sense, and so an appellate court can reverse a
trial court decision that was perfectly correct when rendered but
that has become incorrect by the time of the appeal.3 After
finality attaches, however, the judgment stands even if the law
later changes. To be sure, this is not an absolute and iron-clad
rule; few things in the law (or in life) are. But, at the very least,
the attachment of finality at the end of the appellate process
marks a key turning point.
Because finality has important consequences, the precise
moment that a case becomes final can matter a great deal. As
just stated, finality attaches when the direct appeal concludes.
But that is still inexact. To express it more precisely, a case
becomes final, for federal-law purposes, when the date for
petitioning for certiorari expires or, if a petition is filed, when
the Supreme Court denies it.4 The denial of certiorari is
therefore a decisive event, inasmuch as it marks the boundary
between the still-pending and the now-final, the live and the
dead.
Given that it is simply the day certiorari was denied (or the
day the period for seeking certiorari expired), identifying the
moment of finality is ordinarily very easy and, seemingly, not
the sort of thing that would reward much study. But that initial
impression would be wrong, for there are some interesting issues
that lurk just below the surface. First, note that the Supreme
Court's case-handling practices introduce some discretion into
the date of finality. When the Court has granted certiorari to rule
3. U.S. v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 110 (1801) ("It is in the general true that the
province of an appellate court is only to inquire whether a judgment when rendered was
erroneous or not. But if subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate
court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be
obeyed or its obligation denied."); see also e.g. Johnson v. U.S., 520 U.S. 461, 467-69
(1997) (judging the correctness of the trial court's decision against a legal standard that
post-dated the trial); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 273, 280 (2d Cir.
2005) (relying on a new Supreme Court case to reverse a district court decision that was
the culmination of over two decades of litigation). There are complexities lurking here,
many of which concern the idea of retroactivity. See infra text accompanying nn. 15-22.
4. See e.g. Clay, 537 U.S. at 527 (post-conviction review context); Bradley v. School
Bd, 416 U.S. 696, 710-11 (1974) (civil context).
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on a particular question, the Court could just deny any other
petitions for certiorari that raise the same or similar issues. That
would render those cases final and presumptively not eligible for
the application of the rule the Court is poised to announce. But
the Court's usual practice is not to deny all similar petitions but
instead to hold them on its docket until the plenary decision
comes down. Once the decision is announced, the Court will
then summarily vacate the potentially affected cases and remand
them so that the lower courts can apply the new law and make
any appropriate modifications. To those conversant in the details
of the Court's practices, this is called a GVR (for grant, vacate,
and remand).s In this way, the Court controls whether cases live
or die by controlling the date on which it rules on the petition for
certiorari. Cases do not progress to finality as if on an
unstoppable conveyor belt. Just as impersonal chance and dumb
luck play a role in a particular case's track toward finality, so
does judicial choice.
A second interesting feature of finality in the Supreme
Court-and another point of entry for judicial discretion-is that
a denial of certiorari might itself turn out not to be truly final.
That is because the Court's rules allow a disappointed litigant to
file a petition for rehearing of the denial of certiorari. Many
litigants file petitions for rehearing, and it is usually a futile
gesture.7 But it sometimes bears fruit. Perhaps the most notable
recent grant of rehearing was the Court's decision, in June 2007,
to grant certiorari on rehearing in two Guantanamo detainee
cases after the Court had denied certiorari a few months before.8
The Court granted certiorari in order to give the cases plenary
5. See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Supreme Court's Controversial GVRs-
And an Alternative, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 711 (2009) (discussing the GVR practice); Arthur
D. Hellman, "Granted, Vacated, and Remanded"-Shedding Light on a Dark Corner of
Supreme Court Practice, 67 Judicature 389 (Mar. 1984) (same); see also infra text
accompanying n. 55 (discussing the Court's practice of holding petitions).
6. Sup. Ct. R. 44.2. A litigant can also seek rehearing of a decision on the merits, Sup.
Ct. R. 44.1, but that is not our concern here.
7. See Eugene Gressman et al., Supreme Court Practice 814-15 (9th ed., BNA 2007)
(providing statistics demonstrating the minute proportion of petitions for rehearing that are
granted).
8. Al-Odah v. U.S., 551 U.S. 1161 (2007); Boumediene v. Bush, 551 U.S. 1160
(2007).
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consideration, and, after briefing and oral argument, the cases
led to the landmark opinion known as Boumediene v. Bush.9
This Article concerns instances in which the Court grants
rehearing not in order to give a case plenary review but instead
in order to summarily remand for consideration of a new
development. This is not an everyday occurrence either, but it
happens more than most observers probably realize. Indeed, in
2005 the Supreme Court granted rehearing and then GVR'd in
fourteen cases (or more, if one counts each lower court
judgment separately).' 0 All of those cases involved federal
criminal defendants whose petitions for certiorari were denied
before the Court's major ruling in United States v. Booker,"
which held that the federal Sentencing Guidelines were
unconstitutional if applied in a mandatory fashion. After
deciding Booker, the Court granted rehearing and GVR'd the
fourteen cases, along with hundreds of cases in which petitions
for certiorari were still pending when Booker came down.12
Even more recently, in June 2010, the Court again reheard a
denial of certiorari and GVR'd, this time in Melson v. Allen, 13
which concerned the statute of limitations for habeas corpus
petitions. The Court's actions in Melson and in the Booker cases
rescued the petitioners from finality and gave them a new lease
on life (quite literally so in Melson's case, as he was challenging
a death sentence).
It may be too early to declare a trend, and yet, trend or not,
these events provide an occasion for pondering the largely
unpondered practice of rehearing. In its own unassuming way,
the topic connects up with some broader themes, including the
proper exercise of judicial discretion and the tradeoff between
finality and other procedural values. As we will see, there are
few if any strictly legal limits on the Supreme Court's power to
grant rehearing, even when it comes to very tardy petitions for
rehearing that reopen years-old cases. In that sense, finality is
9. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
10. The Appendix contains a list of rehearing GVRs and supplies some details.
11. 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005).
12. A few hundred of these GVRs can be found by examining the Court's January 24,
2005, order list, 543 U.S. 1097-1117 (2005).
13. _ U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 3491 (2010).
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discretionary and "ultimately depends on the Court's self-
restraint."1 4 It ain't over till it's over, in other words.
To briefly outline the organization of what follows: Part II
explains why the moment of finality matters so much in our
system and how the possibility of rehearing affects the cluster of
values surrounding finality. Because the balance of
considerations bearing on the propriety of allowing rehearing
tips somewhat differently according to the circumstances, Part
III then divides rehearings into three different categories and
evaluates the soundness of the Court's practices in each
category. An Appendix presents original data on cases in which
the Court has granted rehearing in order to remand for
consideration of a new legal development.
II. FINALITY AND REHEARING:
THE STAKES, THE GOVERNING LAW, AND THE RELEVANT
VALUES
To appreciate the importance of the date when finality
attaches, one has to understand how our system handles changes
in law. Our focus here is court-generated changes in law, as that
is the type of change for which the date of finality is most
significant.' The usual rule today is that new rulin s apply to all
cases that are still pending, both civil and criminal. This means
that a decision by a lower court can retroactively become wrong
14. U.S. v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98, 104 (1957) (Harlan, Frankfurter & Burton,
JJ., dissenting).
15. New statutory law is usually prospective in that it does not govern conduct that
occurred before the statute's effective date. Indeed, when it comes to criminal law, the
Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clauses forbid retroactive liability. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl.
1; art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (available at http://www.house.gov/house/Constitution/Constitution
.html). In the civil context, where the constitutional constraints are minimal, the courts
typically avoid retroactive application through statutory interpretation. That is, the courts
presume that the legislature did not intend retroactive effect unless the statute clearly
requires it. See e.g. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265-68, 280 (1994). Thus,
changes in statutory law usually do not apply even to cases that are still pending in the
courts, so the precise date at which a case becomes final is generally not particularly
relevant for statutory changes.
16. See Harper v. Va. Dept. of Taxn., 509 U.S. 86, 94-97 (1993) (civil cases); Griffith
v. Ky., 479 U.S. 314, 320-28 (1987) (criminal cases).
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and in need of correction, even if it was correct when rendered. 17
But we take a different approach once a case becomes final. At
that point, the opportunities for revisiting it are much more
limited. Our reluctance to upset final judgments is particularly
pronounced in civil cases. Although Rule 60 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure permits reopening of final judgments
in certain circumstances, the mere incorrectness of a judgment in
light of new legal developments is ordinarily not sufficient.19 In
criminal cases, there is at least in theory more opportunity for
collateral attack on final judgments, such as through habeas
corpus proceedings. Changes in substantive law (i.e., new
rulings limiting the kinds of conduct that can be criminalized or
the kinds of punishments that are permitted) can support relief in
post-finality collateral proceedings. The much more common
kind of change in law, however, is a new rule of criminal
procedure, and that kind of rule typically does not apply
retroactively to invalidate final judgments. For example, in
17. Not every flawed judgment will be reversed. A litigant seeking reversal might have
to overcome obstacles such as forfeiture rules and unfavorable standards of review. See
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Deciding When To Decide: How Appellate Procedure Distributes
the Costs ofLegal Change, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 203, 212-14 (2011) (discussing the effect of
appellate forfeiture rules); Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal
Cases, 115 Yale L.J. 922, 979-80 (2006) (discussing the effect of plain-error review).
18. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Ga., 501 U.S. 529, 541 (1991) (opinion of
Souter & Stevens, JJ.) ("[R]etroactivity in civil cases must be limited by the need for
finality; once suit is barred by res judicata or by statutes of limitation or repose, a new rule
cannot reopen the door already closed.").
19. Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a district court to
vacate a judgment that was "based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or
vacated," id, but that language only contemplates reopening judgments that were based on
the preclusive effect of a since-invalidated judgment; the rule does not provide relief when
a case relied on as precedent has been reversed. Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure vol. 11, § 2863, at 335 (2d ed., West 1995). Rule 60(b)(5) also
provides relief when "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application." Id This allows relief in some cases involving continuing injunctions, but
most judgments do not involve the requisite prospective effect within the meaning of the
rule. See Wright et al., supra this note, at § 2863, p. 338 n. 14 (citing cases where
prospective effect was not found). Rule 60(b)(6) has sometimes been used to provide relief
based on a change in law, but in most courts the rule is limited to extraordinary cases; a
mere change in law rendering the judgment wrong is insufficient. E.g. DeWeerth v.
Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1272-75 (2d Cir. 1994); see James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's
Federal Practice vol. 12, at § 60.48[5], p. 60-203 (3d ed., Matthew Bender 2010) (calling
the more generous minority view "clearly erroneous").
20. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
329-30 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion). Note that the
discussion here concerns proceedings in federal court-both true habeas proceedings as
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recent years the Supreme Court has decided several cases, most
notably Crawford v. Washington,21 forbidding use of certain out-
of-court statements against criminal defendants. Defendants
whose cases were still on direct appeal could benefit from the
Crawford rules, but those whose direct appeals had concluded
before Crawford could not.22
In sum, the date of finality marks the dividing line between
the category of litigants who can benefit from a favorable
change in law and the category of those who, most likely,
cannot. And, as noted, the attachment of finality occurs when
the period for filing a petition for certiorari expires or the
Supreme Court denies certiorari. Except, that is, when the Court
decides to grant rehearing. 23  The grant of rehearing can,
accordingly, move a litigant from one category to the other.
We can illustrate the effect of rehearing by considering the
fourteen cases in which the Court granted rehearing of a denial
of certiorari and GVR'd in light of Booker.24 These cases
involved federal criminal defendants who raised constitutional
challenges to judicial fact-finding at sentencing. Defendants had
been raising these challenges for years to no avail, and these
particular defendants' petitions for certiorari were denied in May
well as proceedings for federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006). States are free to
provide broader retroactive effect in post-conviction proceedings in their own courts if they
choose. Danforth v. Minn., 552 U.S. 264 (2008).
21. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Later cases in the Crawford line include Melendez-Diaz v.
Mass., 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009), and Davis v. Wash., 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
22. Compare Giles v. Cal., 554 U.S. 353, 357, 377 (2008) (noting that the defendant's
appeal had been pending when Crawford was announced and vacating the defendant's
sentence based on Crawford) with Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007) (holding that
Crawford does not apply to cases that were final on appeal when it was decided).
23. The mere filing of a petition for rehearing has no effect. See Sup. Ct. R. 16.3 ("The
order of denial [of certiorari] will not be suspended pending disposition of a petition for
rehearing except by order of the Court or a Justice."). Finality for purposes of application
of new law attaches at the denial of certiorari, that is, not upon denial of a petition for
rehearing or the expiration of the period for filing for rehearing. See Clay, 537 U.S. at 527
(stating that "[flinality attaches when this Court . . . denies a petition for a writ of
certiorari," without mentioning rehearing); cf Giesberg v. Cockrell, 288 F.3d 268 (5th Cir.
2002) (holding, in the habeas context, that a case becomes final for purposes of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's limitations period with the denial of
certiorari, not the denial of rehearing); Robinson v. US., 416 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2005)
(same, for § 2255 proceedings); but cf Hanover Ins. Co. v. U.S., 880 F.2d 1503 (1st Cir.
1989) (holding that a case was not final for purposes of a provision of the Internal Revenue
Code until the expiration of the period for seeking rehearing of the denial of certiorari).
24. See text accompanying nn. 10-12, supra (discussing these grants of rehearing).
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and June 2004. Then, at the end of June 2004, the Supreme
Court finally embraced their constitutional argument in Blakely
v. Washington,25 which concerned a state sentencing system
very similar to the federal Sentencing Guidelines.26 The federal
defendants now appeared to have a winning argument. But
because these fourteen cases were already final when Blakely
was decided, the new rule of criminal procedure announced in
Blakely would not benefit them.27 So the petitioners in those
cases filed timely petitions for rehearing based on Blakely,
which the Court held on its docket. In January 2005, the Court
extended Blakely to the federal Sentencing Guidelines in
Booker. The Court then granted rehearing and GVR'd the
fourteen cases for further consideration in light of Booker.28 By
doing so, the Supreme Court rescued these cases from finality.
The defendants were therefore eligible for the benefit of the new
rule Booker announced. Indeed, some of them thereby obtained
29new sentencing hearings.
Given the stakes involved in granting rehearing, one's
thoughts naturally turn to the legal regime governing the Court's
power to resurrect final cases. Congress has authorized the
Supreme Court to prescribe rules of practice and procedure.30
The rules the Court has promulgated under that authority
expressly permit petitions for rehearing after a denial of
certiorari and indeed contemplate that the proper grounds for a
petition for rehearing include new developments that followed
25. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
26. Id. at 324-26 (O'Connor & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (emphasizing the similarity
between the state and federal sentencing regimes).
27. See e.g. US. v. Price, 400 F.3d 844, 845, 849 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that Blakely
does not apply retroactively to convictions that became final before it was decided).
Indeed, even if Blakely had applied to those fourteen cases, that probably would not have
been sufficient, as Blakely did not invalidate the federal Guidelines. Booker did that over
six months later. See U.S. v. Rennert, 182 Fed. Appx. 65 (3d Cir. 2006) (denying relief to a
federal defendant whose conviction became final between Blakely and Booker because the
former did not concern the federal Guidelines and the latter was not retroactive);
McReynolds v. U.S., 397 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that the decision in Booker,
not Blakely, marks the relevant date for federal defendants).
28. The cases are listed in the Appendix.
29. E.g. U.S. v. Lauersen, 287 Fed. Appx. 115 (2d Cir. 2008); U.S. v. Campbell, 150
Fed. Appx. 256 (4th Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Van Alstyne, 143 Fed. Appx. 45 (9th Cir. 2005).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2006) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
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the denial of certiorari.3 1 The rules currently permit the filing of
petitions for rehearing for a period of twenty-five days following
the denial of certiorari.32 There is no particular timetable on
which the Court must rule on the petition for rehearing; petitions
have sometimes been left to linger for a couple of years, during
which events ripened to a point where rehearing was granted
based on an eventual change in the legal landscape.33
A nice question of authority concerns whether the Court
can accept a petition for rehearing filed after the twenty-five-day
deadline specified in its rules. Although the rules flatly state that
the Clerk will not accept an untimely filing, 34 the Court's
precedents show that the Court may-and in exceedingly rare
instances does-entertain an untimely petition for rehearing if
the petition is accompanied by a motion seeking leave to file out
of time.35 So, as far as the Court is concerned, it seems there is
no strict legal barrier to the consideration of tardy petitions for
rehearing. In defense of the Court's assertion of authority, it is
perhaps relevant that the twenty-five-day deadline is the product
of the Court's own rules rather than a congressional command, a
distinction that has led the Court to exercise a freer hand in
31. Sup. Ct. R. 44.2 (stating that a petition for rehearing should assert "intervening
circumstances of a substantial or controlling effect or . . . other substantial grounds not
previously presented").
32. Id.
33. E.g. Fla. v. Rodriguez, 461 U.S. 940 (1983) (granting, on May 23, 1983, rehearing
of a denial of certiorari dated May 26, 1981); Place v. Weinberger, 426 U.S. 932 (1976)
(granting, on June 14, 1976, rehearing of a denial of certiorari dated Nov. 25, 1974).
34. Sup. Ct. R. 44.4.
35. See Foster v. Tex., U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 1848 (2011); Gondeck v. Pan Am.
World Airways, 382 U.S. 25 (1965); Ohio Power, 353 U.S. 98; Gressman et al., supra n. 7,
at 809-15; see also Carlisle v. U.S., 517 U.S. 416, 450-451 (1996) (Stevens & Kennedy,
JJ., dissenting) ("On rare occasions ... we have held that the interest in the evenhanded
administration of justice outweighs the interest in finality and granted [petitions for
rehearing] even though untimely and even though there is not a word in our Rules that
authorized such action."). The Chief Justice, sitting as Circuit Justice for the D.C. Circuit,
recently ruled that the Court's rules do not permit extensions of the time for filing petitions
for rehearing after denial of certiorari. Boumediene v. Bush, 550 U.S. 1301 (2007)
(Roberts, C.J., in chambers). His view is compelling as an interpretation of the Court's
rules regarding extensions, but his opinion does not mention the separate matter of granting
leave to file an admittedly untimely petition for rehearing. Although the leading cases
asserting that power are aging, they have never been overruled. Therefore, it seems best to
say that although the deadline for timely filing cannot be extended (per the Chief Justice),
an untimely filing can still be accepted in the unusual case in which the Court wishes to so
exercise its discretion (per the older cases).
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excusing non-compliance with filing deadlines in other
contexts.3 6 Further, a power to grant rehearing out of time is
consistent with the acknowledged (if rarely exercised) power of
the federal courts of appeals to recall their mandates and
entertain tardy petitions for rehearing. 37
The Supreme Court's power to grant rehearing out of time
can have striking results vis-d-vis finality. In perhaps the most
famous case 38 the Court granted a petition for rehearing filed
over three years after the denial of certiorari. The Court's
avowed standard for deciding whether to permit an untimely
filing is whether doing so would advance "the interests of
jU . ,,39
justice.
The power to grant rehearing, timely or not, implicates a
number of traditional procedural values such as accuracy,
repose, equal treatment, and judicial economy. The clash
between accuracy and repose is particularly sharp: We want
cases decided correctly, but there must at some point be an end
to litigation. The notion of finality, after all, is premised on the
need to limit the continuing quest for present accuracy in light of
the countervailing value of repose; the date of finality marks the
point at which we have decided the former value is eclipsed by
the latter. Rehearing, which potentially extends the finality date,
sacrifices some repose. Tardy rehearings sacrifice it much more,
which is one reason they are especially controversial.40 The
Court's authority to accept late petitions also implicates classic
36. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 211-12 (2007) (citing Schacht v. U.S, 398
U.S. 58 (1970), and distinguishing the time period for petitioning for certiorari in a civil
case, which is fixed by statute, from the period in a criminal case, which is set forth only in
the Court's rules and "can be relaxed by the Court in the exercise of its discretion"). The
situation is different for untimely petitions for rehearing in cases originating in the Tax
Court: The Court has held that it lacks the power to entertain an untimely petition for
rehearing in those cases, as the Internal Revenue Code specifies when such cases become
final. R. Simpson & Co. v. CIR., 321 U.S. 225 (1944); Gressman et al., supra n. 7, at 814.
37. See Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure vol. 16AA, §
3986, pp. 597-98 (4th ed. West 2008) (explaining that this power exists, though only for
use in extraordinary circumstances).
38. Gondeck, 382 U.S. 25.
39. Ohio Power, 353 U.S. at 99.
40. Several justices, led by Justice Harlan, opposed the practice of granting rehearing
out of time. Gondeck, 382 U.S. at 30 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Ohio Power, 353 U.S. at 99
(Harlan, Frankfurter & Burton, JJ., dissenting); see also Gondeck, 382 U.S. at 28 (Clark, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the Court's "rule of 'no finality' but considering
himself bound by precedent to permit untimely rehearings).
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debates over rules versus standards and the role of equitable
41discretion.
Equality plays an important but complicated role in the
rehearing context. On the one hand, part of the reason for
granting rehearing is to ensure that the same rule applies to all
litigants who are similarly situated-similar, that is, except for
the fact that one case became final before the other. That two
cases proceeded through the judicial system at different rates
often has nothing to do with the litigants or their entitlements to
relief; it is in that sense arbitrary.42 Of course, there may be no
stopping point to this logic: Wherever we push the line of
finality-the twenty-five days provided in the rules or some
other limit-there will be another slightly older case just on the
other side of it. Further, reopening cases threatens its own kind
of inequality if the Court exercises its power haphazardly,
granting rehearing to one lucky litigant but not to others with
similar claims.43 That is, before granting rehearing the Court
should ask itself whether it is prepared to take such action in
every similar case. Here too arises the question of judicial
economy, for although no particular grant of rehearing involves
41. There is a vast literature on these topics. For a few recent entries that focus on
procedural matters in particular, see Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at
Procedural Discretion, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1961, 2002-23 (2007), and Jonathan Remy
Nash, Instrument Choice in Federal Court Jurisdiction: Rules, Standards, and Discretion
(Emory Public Law Research Paper No. 10-92), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1553584 (2010) (accessed Aug. 31, 2010; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
42. For statements to the effect that case outcomes should not turn on arbitrary matters
of timing, see, for example, Straight v. Wainwright, 476 U.S. 1132, 1135 (1986) (Brennan,
Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting); US. v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 555-56 (1982).
43. See e.g. Weed v. Bilbrey, 400 U.S. 982, 984 (1970) (Douglas & Black, JJ.,
dissenting) ("The facts of this case are even more compelling than those in [Gondeck]...
All [this litigant] asks is that the Court apply the law in her case that was applied in the one
following hers."). It is hard to say whether the Court's rehearing practices can be charged
with causing arbitrarily disparate treatment. Weed involved an untimely petition for
rehearing, the grant of which is so exceedingly rare that perhaps it is fruitless to seek any
sort of consistency. In the context of timely petitions for rehearing, it can make a bit more
sense to speak of a petitioner having a legitimate expectation of relief if the relevant
standard-intervening circumstances under Sup. Ct. R. 44.2-is satisfied. I have looked
into the circumstances of a number of cases, and I have often found it hard to say why the
Court did not grant rehearing in light of a seemingly relevant intervening development. Of
course, that does not mean that the Court did not have a valid reason (e.g., the Justices
believed that the new development was not quite on point, or there were other grounds that
amply supported the existing judgment); it is just that the decisions are hard for an outsider
to explain, given that the Court typically does not provide reasons for these actions.
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much work, the Court's behavior will affect, at the margin, how
many petitions for rehearing litigants decide to file, which does
involve a cost to the judicial system in the aggregate.
III. DISAGGREGATING REHEARINGS
So how do these competing considerations come out, on
balance? What would a defensible regime of rehearing look like,
and does the Supreme Court currently have one?
To answer these questions, it is useful to begin by dividing
up rehearings into distinct categories. The different categories
reflect the different alignments of critical dates in two separate
cases: (1) the case in which certiorari has been denied and in
which rehearing is sought, and (2) the plenary case that would
supply the basis for the potential GVR on rehearing." In Figure
1 below, the line represents the progress of the plenary case. The
arrows show the different points at which certiorari might have
been denied in the case that is the candidate for a GVR on
rehearing.
Figure 1
Progress of Plenary Case: * * 0
Grant of Certiorari Merits Decision
Time of denial of cert.
in potential GVR'd case:
Type of rehearing GVR: Resurrection Missed Hold Missed GVR
As Figure 1 shows, there are three different types of
rehearing GVRs that can result: (1) those cases in which
certiorari is denied-and finality attaches-before the grant of
certiorari in the plenary case (what I call "resurrection" cases,
because the grant of rehearing saves a case that to all
44. The discussion here focuses on GVRs that are triggered by new Supreme Court
decisions, which are the large bulk of all GVRs. See Bruhl, supra n. 5, at 720 (providing
statistics on GVRs by category). The same general principles could be applied to rarer
types, mutatis mutandis.
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appearances was over), (2) those cases in which certiorari was
denied after the grant of certiorari in the plenary case ("missed
holds," because these could and perhaps should have been held
pending the plenary decision), and (3) those cases in which
certiorari is denied after the issuance of a decision on the merits
in the plenary case ("missed GVRs," because these could and
perhaps should have been GVR'd rather than denied). I should
note that this terminology of "missed holds" and "missed
GVRs" perhaps suggests a lapse on the Court's part. Some
defect in case management might indeed be involved, but it need
not be, as discussed below. 45
The Appendix presents a list of rehearing GVRs from 1965
to present, classified according to the above criteria. The
different categories present different balances of the relevant
considerations. In the material below, I discuss the categories in
the order of easiest to hardest to justify.
A. Missed GVRs
The easiest category is what we might call the "missed
GVR." Here the Court's denial of certiorari follows the plenary
decision that arguably supports a GVR. The petition could or
should have been GVR'd in light of the new plenary decision,
but for whatever reason it was not.
The key fact about this category of case is that, because the
law changed before the denial of certiorari-and thus before
finality attached-our current retroactivity doctrines tell us that
the case should be governed by the new law. By granting
rehearing and GVR'ing, the Supreme Court can readily bring
about the necessary reconsideration. But even without a GVR,
that same reconsideration really should be available through
some procedure or another-whether it be a recall of the
appellate mandate,46 a motion under Federal Rule of Civil
45. See infra nn. 51-54 and accompanying text.
46. See e.g. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 424 F.2d 427, 428-30 (2d
Cir. 1970) (granting rehearing out of time-and after the denial of certiorari-where a
change in law had occurred before the case became final); U.S. v. Skandier, 125 F.3d 178,
182-83 (3d Cir. 1997) (recalling the mandate and granting rehearing based on a Supreme
Court decision issued approximately one month after the prior ruling of the court of
appeals).
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Procedure 60(b),47 or a proceeding for collateral review.48 The
reason, again, is that the case was not final when the law
changed, and so the new law should apply to it.
Once it is understood that new law should apply, the
question becomes which procedural route makes the most sense
as a matter of judicial administration. If one were starting from
scratch, it might be hard to identify the ideal method of securing
reconsideration in these cases. Nonetheless, taking current
institutional arrangements more or less as they now stand, it
seems sensible that the Supreme Court should go ahead and
grant rehearing and GVR, at least if the petition for rehearing is
timely.49 For one thing, the petition for certiorari has just been
before the Supreme Court, and the Court might have failed to
GVR only because of a glitch in its own internal case
management. For another thing, although the other review
mechanisms mentioned above have sometimes been used in
these kinds of situations, courts tend to use them sparingly. That
reluctance is ordinarily altogether appropriate, for litigation does
at some point need to come to an end. Unfortunately, the
disinclination to grant relief from final judgments sometimes
spills over into circumstances like this, where reconsideration
really is proper because finality had not yet attached when the
47. See e.g. Schmitt v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 187 F.R.D. 568 (S.D. Ind. 1999)
(granting Rule 60(b)(6) relief where a change in law occurred over a year after the
judgment but before the case became final on appeal).
48. See e.g. U.S. v. Becker, 502 F.3d 122, 127-29 (2d Cir. 2005) (affirming district
court's grant of § 2255 relief based on a new case decided before the period for seeking
certiorari had expired, even though no petition for certiorari was filed); see also Derman v.
U.S., 298 F.3d 34, 39-42 (1st Cir. 2002) (similar). This route might not be available to
habeas petitioners in state custody in light of amendments in the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which arguably imposed a slightly different
retroactivity trigger according to which the relevant date for determining the defendant's
entitlement to the benefit of new law is the date of the state court decision, not the date of
the denial of certiorari. See Smith v. Spisak,_ U.S. _, _, 130 S. Ct. 676, 681 (2010)
(noting uncertainty on the question). The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to
decide the question. Greene v. Palakovich, 606 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub
nom. Greene v. Fisher, _ U.S. _ 131 S. Ct. 1813 (2011). If the Supreme Court rules
that habeas relief is unavailable when a change in law occurs after the state court's ruling
but before the case becomes final on direct appeal, that would increase the importance of
the GVR procedure.
49. It is hard to see why the Court should consider a late petition for rehearing in this
kind of case. The GVR-generating event was already on the books when certiorari was
denied, and twenty-five days is sufficient time for a litigant to bring the apparent oversight
to the Court's attention.
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law shifted.so Lower courts should change their practices in this
regard. But as long as the prospect for relief through alternative
avenues remains dicey, it makes sense for the Supreme Court to
GVR.
A few words regarding blame are now in order. So far we
have been speaking as if the Court's failure to GVR was
traceable to some lapse on its part: It "missed" the need to GVR.
In certain cases, it seems that some internal mistake may indeed
have occurred."' But it can also happen that the Court will fail to
GVR because the petition for certiorari in the missed case raised
other questions, not the question decided in the plenary case.
When that happens, the Court probably cannot be blamed for
failing to see, lurking in the record, the relevance of the recent
plenary decision. Depending on the timing of the relevant
events, perhaps the petitioner should have included an additional
point in the petition for certiorari or supplemented the certiorari
filings to bring a new development to the Court's attention
before the Court's consideration of the petition.52 If the
50. Concerning recall of the mandate, for instance, consider U.S. v. Fraser, 407 F.3d 9,
10-11 (1st Cir. 2005) (refusing to recall the mandate in light of a Supreme Court decision
issued approximately two months after the circuit court's prior ruling); and Richardson v.
Reno, 175 F.3d 898, 899 (11 th Cir. 1999) (similar).
51. Because the Court's deliberations are private, and because grants of petitions for
rehearing are usually not explained, it is hard to know exactly what motivated the Court to
act in any given case. In some cases, however, one can engage in informed speculation
based on statements in the parties' briefs and, more interestingly, evidence from retired
Justices' papers. Based on these sources, it appears that a rehearing has sometimes been
occasioned by a mistake or misjudgment on the Court's part. For example, the Blackmun
papers suggest that the petition for certiorari in Adams v. Evatt, 511 U.S. 1001 (1994), was
held in anticipation of one case, and then denied when that case did not help the petitioner;
but the petition probably should have also been held in anticipation of another case that
turned out to be more relevant to the petitioner's claims. (The pool memo had
recommended a hold in light of both cases.) After the initial denial of certiorari, the Court
granted a petition for rehearing and GVR'd based on the second case. See Lee Epstein et
al., The Digital Archive of the Papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, File for No. 92-6259
at 18, 20, 22, 34, http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/blackmunMemos/1993/
Denied-pdf/92-6259.pdf (reproducing relevant portions of internal memos) (accessed Sept.
1, 2011; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). In another case,
Friend v. U.S., 517 U.S. 1152 (1996), the Court denied certiorari even though the
government's response to the petition for certiorari suggested a GVR. Br. of the U.S.,
Friend v. U.S., 1996 WL 33439756 (No. 95-642, 517 U.S. 1152 (1996)) at 7. On
petitioner's motion, the Court granted rehearing and GVR'd, which suggests that the initial
denial may have been a mistake.
52. See Sup. Ct. R. 15.8 (permitting petitioner to file a supplemental brief "calling
attention to new cases, new legislation, or other intervening matter").
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petitioner fails to do so, it might be defensible for the Court to
employ a type of forfeiture rule: no grants of rehearing based on
developments that could have been-but were not-brought to
the Court's attention before the denial of certiorari.
Whether the Court ever employs such a forfeiture rule is
impossible to know, as there is no formal statement one way or
the other, but it appears that the Court will sometimes GVR
based on a new issue that was not presented before the denial of
certiorari.53 Of course, even if the Supreme Court does not
firmly impose a forfeiture rule, some lower courts might
nonetheless do so on remand. Indeed, one of the secrets of the
GVR practice is that, at least in some circuits, many GVRs do
not trigger any reconsideration at all.54 I do not take a position
on forfeiture here, except to point out that a rational procedural
system could choose to treat petitioners differently based on
whether the issue raised in their petition for rehearing should
have been presented earlier.
B. Missed Holds
Sometimes several petitions for certiorari filed around the
same time present the same or a similar question. If the Court
decides to grant certiorari to decide this question, one possibility
53. E.g. Hawkins v. U.S., 543 U.S. 1097 (2005) (issuing GVR on rehearing where the
petition for rehearing (2004 WL 1672185) concedes that the relevant issue was not raised
in the petition for certiorari); Criston v. U.S., 543 U.S. 1117 (2005) (same; petition for
rehearing on file with author); see also Gressman et al., supra n. 7, at 821 ("Questions not
presented in the original petition are not foreclosed upon rehearing . . . ."). Because there
are many denied petitions for rehearing, and the reasons for a denial are hard to discern, it
may be true that the Court does in certain cases apply a forfeiture rule. Cf Lawrence v.
Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167-68 (1996) (suggesting that the Court will consider the equities
of the case and could withhold a GVR in cases of manipulative litigation strategy).
54. Courts of appeals hold strikingly divergent attitudes about how to respond to GVRs
that are based on issues raised late in the day. Compare e.g. US. v. Taylor, 409 F.3d 675,
676 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that, "absent extraordinary circumstances," the court would
not consider an issue raised for the first time in a petition for certiorari, despite the
Supreme Court's GVR for reconsideration), and U.S. v. Levy, 416 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir.
2005) (deeming an issue forfeited where it was raised for the first time in a petition for
rehearing in the court of appeals, even though the litigant subsequently obtained a GVR
from the Supreme Court on the same issue), with e.g. U.S. v. Young, 160 Fed. Appx. 518,
519-20 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that the litigant raised an issue for the first time in a
supplemental petition for certiorari but not mentioning the possibility of forfeiture), and
U.S. v. Drewry, 133 Fed. Appx. 543, 544 (10th Cir. 2005) (similar, where issue was raised
for the first time in the petition for certiorari).
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would be for the Court simply to deny certiorari in all of the
cases besides the one given plenary consideration. But that is not
the usual practice. Rather, the Court holds the rest of the
petitions. Still more petitions might come in while the plenary
case is pending, and these too are held. 5 Then, once the plenary
decision is announced, the Court will GVR those cases that
might be impacted and deny certiorari in those that clearly are
not.
From time to time, the Court denies a petition that could
have been a candidate for a hold. The denial of certiorari makes
the case final, such that the petitioner cannot benefit should the
plenary case later come out in his favor. To avoid this fate, the
petitioner can seek rehearing and try to persuade the Court that
the petition should be held pending the plenary case. If the Court
agrees, it can vacate the prior denial of certiorari and GVR when
the plenary decision comes down, assuming it comes down in a
way that might help the petitioner.
As with missed GVRs, these cases also seem, in the main,
fairly easy to justify. If the Court is going to hold cases that
might be affected by a forthcoming decision, it should do so in a
consistent way. It seems unfair that similarly situated petitioners
should be treated differently. And this is especially true when
the cause is simply that the Court's internal mechanisms for
coordinating cases let one slip through the cracks. (As before,
note that the Court might not be at fault here: The denied
petition might not have focused on the issue that becomes
crucial only after the grant of certiorari in another case. The
petitioner might not be at fault either, especially if his petition
for certiorari was denied very soon after the grant in the plenary
case, so that there was no reasonable opportunity to point out the
relationship between the cases. Again, the point is just that one
could imagine the Court considering these sorts of equitable
55. For descriptions of the Court's hold practices, see Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S.
Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1067, 1109-31
(1988), and Arthur D. Hellman, The Supreme Court's Second Thoughts: Remands for
Reconsideration and Denials of Review in Cases Held for Plenary Decisions, 11 Hastings
Const. L.Q. 5 (1983). Some petitions for certiorari expressly request a hold rather than
plenary consideration. E.g. Pet. for Writ of Cert., U.S. v. Praylow, _ U.S. , 131 S. Ct.
1467, 2010 WL 3501270 (Sept. 7, 2010); Pet. for Writ of Cert., Sonic Automotive v. Watts,
_ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 2872, 2010 WL 3452212 (Aug. 31, 2010).
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factors. It would be desirable for the Court to state its policy
expressly.)
C. Resurrected Cases
The final category, and the most difficult, involves
resurrected cases. These are cases in which certiorari was
denied-and thus finality apparently attached-but certiorari
was later granted in a case presenting a related question. At the
time certiorari was denied, in other words, there was no basis for
either a hold or a GVR, as there was no plenary case presenting
the same issue.
Granting rehearing in this type of case is at least potentially
problematic. It happens all the time that a petition for certiorari
is denied and then, sooner or later, the Court determines to
decide the very question presented by the earlier petition. Circuit
splits and other serious legal uncertainties can persist for years,
with numerous denied petitions for certiorari, until the Court is
finally moved to settle the issue.5 6 Granting rehearing in light of
such later developments pits the value of repose against the
desire to govern like cases by like law. At what point is a matter
finally closed?
The balance struck by current practice seems sensible
enough. The magnitude of the threat to repose depends on the
length of the period for upsetting the apparent finality that
accompanies the denial of certiorari. Under the Court's current
rules, that period is only twenty-five days,57 which seems minor
given the lifespan of a typical case. Thus the downside is
limited. There is, moreover, an important affirmative advantage
in allowing a brief window for reviving cases that are otherwise
final. One might initially think that resurrection rehearings
cannot plausibly be blamed on any sort of defect in the Court's
case management procedures: After all, no case presenting
related issues had been granted or decided when the petition was
56. E.g. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, _, 129 S. Ct. 1262, 1270 (2009) (citing
conflicting lower court opinions stretching back over more than fifteen years); Smith v.
City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 230 (2005) (deciding the important question of whether a
disparate-impact theory was available under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
which was enacted in 1967).
57. Sup. Ct. R. 44.2; supra text accompanying nn. 31-32.
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denied, so there was no occasion for a GVR or hold. But that is
not exactly right. Consider Melson, the recent grant of rehearing
mentioned at the outset. 8 The Supreme Court originally denied
certiorari in Melson on October 5, 2009. Then, at the conference
of October 9, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Holland v.
Florida,5 9 another Eleventh Circuit habeas case that raised a
similar issue. As discussed above, the Court often realizes that
multiple pending petitions raise related issues and processes
them in a coordinated way, granting one case and holding
others. One can easily imagine a scenario in which the Melson
petition for certiorari was not denied on October 5 but was
considered together with Holland. That did not happen, of
course. This failure does not necessarily reflect any negligence
on the part of the Court or the parties. Still, it does seem that this
kind of near miss would not occur under a more perfect system
of coordination. Thus, one virtue of permitting a short window
for reconsideration after the denial of certiorari is that it provides
a rough means of remedying the problem of petitions that pass
in the night.
And yet the nature of things is that, wherever one draws the
line, there will be cases on the other side of it that call out for
attention. Sometimes a case may be so compelling that special
treatment is warranted despite the need for finality and the value
of preserving bright lines. Perhaps this is why the Court has
asserted the power to accept an untimely petition for rehearing. 60
The power had never been exercised freely and, over the course
of the last few decades, it had fallen into disuse.6 1 But then in
April 2011 the Court granted a stay of execution and
simultaneously granted leave to file an untimely petition for
rehearing in Foster v. Texas.62 (The next month, the Court
58. See text accompanying n. 13, supra.
59. _ U.S. -, 130 S. Ct. 398 (2009). The order granting certiorari in Holland was
issued on October 13, 2009, see id, but the Court's online docket shows that the case was
considered at the October 9 conference. (The Court's online docket is available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov, where one can highlight "Docket" on the main page and then
click "Docket Search" to reach a search box.)
60. See text accompanying nn. 34-37, supra.
61. See Gressman et al., supra n. 7, at 813 (opining that the Court has "decided no
longer to grant out-of-time petitions for rehearing even for the most equitable of reasons"
but acknowledging uncertainty).
62, _ U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 1848. It was not the first time the Roberts Court had
dusted off a nearly forgotten special procedure. See e.g. In re Davis, _ U.S. _, 130 S.
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denied the petition for rehearing. 63) It seems unlikely that the
Court is back in the business of permitting untimely petitions for
rehearing with any sort of regularity. But time, which is after all
our chief concern here, will tell.
IV. CONCLUSION
Litigation must at some point come to an end. For purposes
of applying new legal developments, the denial of a petition for
certiorari usually marks the end. Occasionally the Supreme
Court will grant a reprieve in the form of rehearing after denial
of certiorari. This action is relatively rare, but it holds some
unexpected interest both theoretically and practically. The
Court's rehearing practice involves a delicate balance of
economy, equality, accuracy, and repose. It also shows that
something as seemingly mechanical as the date of finality is not
influenced only by chance but also by judicial choice, namely
the Court's decisions to hold petitions for certiorari on its docket
while the legal landscape changes and, sometimes, to revive a
case that had been left behind.
Ct. 1 (2009) (employing "original habeas" procedure in a capital case for the first time in
several decades).
63. _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 2951 (2011). Foster sought rehearing on the ground that
his case could be affected by a case in which the Court had granted certiorari shortly after
his twenty-five day period for seeking rehearing expired. Pet. for Rehg. of Order Denying
Pet. for Writ of Cert., Foster v. Tex., No. 10-8317, http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/04/Foster-rehearing-petition.pdf (accessed Sept. 1, 2011; copy on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). The Court's online docket indicates that
the potentially relevant case, Maples v. Thomas (No. 10-63), was set to be heard during the
Court's following term. The Court could have held Foster's petition for rehearing until
Maples was decided, but it chose not to do so. One cannot say whether the Court
determined that Maples would not affect the result in Foster's case or whether it simply
decided that it was inappropriate to postpone finality in order to find out.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix presents two tables showing cases, from
1965 to present, in which the Supreme Court initially denied
certiorari and then, on rehearin, vacated and remanded in light
of a new legal development. The list of cases, which was
generated through keyword searches of electronic databases,
should be at least reasonably comprehensive, but I cannot
exclude the possibility of having missed some cases. In none
of these cases did the Court grant an untimely petition for
rehearing.
Because many rehearing GVRs were triggered by United
States v. Booker, those are separated out and presented on their
own table in a slightly different format.
* There were a few cases in which the Solicitor General apparently first disclosed some
potentially relevant fact in responding to a petition for rehearing. E.g. Schipani v. U.S., 385
U.S. 372 (1966) (resulting in the decision reported as US. v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43
(E.D.N.Y. 1968), which notes that "[t]he Supreme Court, upon being informed by the
Solicitor General that the defendant . . . was a participant in a number of conversations
which had been electronically monitored by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and which led to the use of tainted evidence against the defendant, vacated the defendant's
conviction . . . and remanded," id. at 45). These confession-of-error situations are not
included here. Also excluded are cases in which the original disposition was not a denial of
certiorari but was instead a decision on the merits. E.g. Parker Seal Co. v. Cummins, 429
U.S. 65 (1976) (affirming by reason of an equally divided court), vacated on rehearing,
433 U.S. 903 (1977) (remanding for reconsideration in light of a subsequent case).
The decision to start with 1965 is not completely arbitrary. In the 1960s the Court
was in the midst of gradually transitioning from implementing intervening decisions
through summary reversals to using GVRs. See Arthur D. Hellman, Error Correction,
Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court's Exercise of Discretionary Review, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
795, 836-38 (1983). Because the GVR is the relevant device today, it makes some sense to
begin the study at approximately the time when GVRs were becoming more common.
** The following searches were run in the Supreme Court databases in both Lexis and
Westlaw: (1) "petition for rehearing is granted" or "petition for rehearing granted" or
"upon consideration of the petition for rehearing"; (2) "vacat! /s remand! /s (proceedings or
consideration) and rehearing /s grant!"; and (3) "rehearing /s vacat! /p remand! /p petition."
Multiple searches were used because the language used in rehearing orders is not always
identical (perhaps because the orders are too infrequent to acquire a uniform boilerplate
format). The risk that I have missed a case increases the further back one goes, because the
Court's summary disposition practices were not always as routinized as they have become.
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Table 1
Cases GVR'd on Rehearing (excluding Booker Cases)
Case GVR Cert. Trigger Case Trigger Trigger
Type' Case Date Denial and Cert. Date Case Case
Date Argued Decided
Melson v. Allen, Holland v. Fla.
Resurr. 130 S. Ct. 3491 6/21/10 10/5/09 10/13/09 3/1/10 6/14/10
Friend v. U.S., Bailey v. U.S.
MGVR 517 U.S. 1152 4/22/96 1/22/96 4/17/95 10/30/95 12/6/95
Fuentes v. U.S., Bailey v. U.S.
MHold 516 U.S. 1022 12/11/95 5/30/95 4/17/95 10/30/95 12/6/95
Adams v. Evatt, Sullivan v. La.
MGVR 511 U.S. 1001 3/28/94 6/14/93 10/19/92 3/29/93 6/1/93
Hitchcock v. Espinosa v. Fla.
Resurr. Fla., 6/29/92 10/15/91 6/29/92 n/a** 6/29/92
505 U.S. 1215
West v. N.W. Morales v.
MGVR Airlines, 6/22/92 6/8/92 TWA 3/3/92 6/1/92
505 U.S. 1201 11/27/91
Booker v. Miss., Caldwell v.
Resurr. 472 U.S. 1023 6/24/85 10/1/84 Miss. 2/25/85 6/11/85
10/9/84
Leverson v. Williams v. Vt.
Resurr. Conway, 6/17/85 10/29/84 12/10/84 3/19/85 6/4/85
472 U.S. 1014
Cal. v. Howard, Cal. v. Beheler
MGVR 469 U.S. 806 10/1/84 4/30/84 7/6/83 n/a" 7/6/83
Simmons v. Sea- Pallas Shipping
Resurr. Land Servs., 6/13/83 10/12/82 v. Duris 4/25/83 5/23/83
462 U.S. 1114 11/15/82
Fla. v. Fla. v. Royer
Resurr. Rodriguez, 5/23/83 5/26/81 11/30/81 10/12/82 3/23/83
461 U.S. 940
Harris v. Scindia Steam
Resurr. Reederei, 5/4/81 10/1/79 v. De Los 12/1/80 4/21/81
451 U.S. 9654 Santos
5/12/80
Lee Way Motor E. Tex. Motor
MHold v. Resendis, 6/6/77 5/24/76 v. Rodriguez 1/10- 5/31/77
431 U.S. 952 5/24/76 11/77
Place v. Brown v. GSA
Resurr. Weinberger, 6/14/76 11/25/74 5/27/75 3/1-2/76 6/1/76
426 U.S. 932
McKenzie v. McNeil v.
Resurr. Director, 6/26/72 11/22/71 Director 4/20/72 6/19/72
. 408 U.S. 916 12/20/71 1
* Resurr. = resurrected; MHold = missed hold; MGVR = missed GVR.
** Espinosa and Beheler were summarily reversed.
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*** Giordano was summarily vacated.
Table 1 (continued)
Cases GVR'd on Rehearing Iexcluding Booker Cases)
Case GVR Cert. Trigger Case Trigger Trigger
Type Case Date Denial and Cert. Date Case Case
Date Argued Decided
Balistrieri v. Alderman v.
MGVR U.S., 6/16/69 4/21/69 U.S.; 10/14/68; 3/10/69;
395 U.S. 710 Giordano v. U.S. n/a'" 3/24/69
1/29/68; 3/24/69
Jones v. U.S., Bruton v. U.S.
MHold 392 U.S. 299 6/10/68 10/9/67 10/9/67 3/11/68 5/20/68
McBride v. Schneider v.
Resurr. Smith, 3/18/68 3/29/67 Smith 12/12- 1/16/68
390 U.S. 411 10/9/67 13/67
Forgett v. U.S., Haynes v. U.S.
Resurr. 390 U.S. 203 3/4/68 2/28/66 6/12/67 10/11/67 1/29/68
O'Connor v. Griffin v. Cal.
MGVR Ohio, 12/13/65 10/11/65 6/22/64 3/9/65 4/28/65
382 U.S. 286
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Table 2
*
Cases GVR'd on Rehearing in Light of Booker
Case GVR Date Cert. Denial Date
Hawkins v. U.S., Jan. 24, 2005 June 21, 2004
543 U.S. 1097
Lauersen v. U.S., Jan. 24, 2005 May 17, 2004
543 U.S. 1097
Rideout v. U.S., Jan. 24, 2005 June 28, 2004
543 U.S. 1116
Jimenez-Velasco v. U.S., Jan. 24, 2005 June 14, 2004
543 U.S. 1116
Epps v. U.S., Jan. 24, 2005 June 14, 2004
543 U.S. 1116
Van Alstyne v. U.S., Jan. 24, 2005 June 21, 2004
543 U.S. 1116
Carbajal-Martinez v. U.S., Jan. 24, 2005 June 21, 2004
543 U.S. 1116
McDonnell v. U.S., Jan. 24, 2005 June 14, 2004
543 U.S. 1116
Pearson v. U.S., Jan. 24, 2005 June 21, 2004
543 U.S. 1116
Salas v. U.S., Jan. 24, 2005 June 21, 2004
543 U.S. 1116
Criston v. U.S., Jan. 24, 2005 June 21, 2004
543 U.S. 1117
Campbell v. U.S., Jan. 24, 2005 June 21, 2004
543 U.S. 1116
Valadez Soto v. U.S., Jan. 24, 2005 June 21, 2004
543 U.S. 1117
Newsome v. U.S., Jan. 24, 2005 June 14, 2004
543 U.S. 1116
* Blakely was decided on June 28, 2004. Certiorari was granted in Booker on August 2,
2004; it was argued on October 4, 2004, and decided on January 12, 2005. The fourteen
cases in this table are those in which the Supreme Court denied certiorari very shortly
before (or on) June 28, 2004, the disappointed litigants timely filed petitions for rehearing
in light of Blakely, and then the Court granted rehearing after Booker was decided.
These Booker-rehearing GVRs are difficult to characterize. They might be called
missed holds on the ground that the petitions for certiorari should have been held pending
Blakely and then GVR'd. But I believe it is better to consider them resurrection cases. First,
the Court generally did not hold and GVR federal cases in light of Blakely. Second, a
remand in light of Blakely, which concerned state sentencing, would not have entitled the
petitioners to relief; they obtained relief only because the finality of their cases was
extended past the decision in Booker. See supra n. 27.
Some of these cases involved petitions covering multiple lower court judgments. See
e.g. Newsome v. U.S., 543 U.S. 1116 (2005) (more than ten lower court cases); see also
Sup. Ct. R. 12.4 (allowing use of a single petition for certiorari to cover multiple judgments
from the same court involving closely related legal issues). Thus, if the lower court
judgment were treated as the unit of analysis, the number of rehearings would be higher.
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